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1Risk, Fear, Blame, Shame and the Regulation of Public Safety
Abstract: The question of when people may impose risks on each other is of fundamental 
moral importance. Forms of ‘quantified risk assessment’, especially risk cost-benefit 
analysis, provide one powerful approach to providing a systematic answer. It is also well-
known that such techniques can show that existing resources could be used more 
effectively to reduce risk overall. Thus it is often argued that some current practices are 
irrational. On the other hand critics of quantified risk assessment argue that it cannot 
adequately capture all relevant features, such as ‘societal concern’ and so should be 
abandoned. In this paper I argue that current forms of quantified risk assessment are 
inadequate, and in themselves, therefore, insufficient to demonstrate that current practices 
are irrational. In particular I will argue that insufficient attention has been given to the 
cause of a hazard, which needs to be treated as a primary variable in its own right. 
However rather than reject quantified risk assessment I wish to supplement it by 
proposing a framework to make explicit the role causation plays in the understanding of 
risk, and how it interacts with factors which influence perception of risks and other 
attitudes to risk control. Once an improved description of risk perception is available it 
will become possible to have a more informed debate about the normative question: how 
safety should be regulated.1
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21. Introduction
When can people knowingly impose risks on each other? This question is central to such 
issues as transport safety policy, environmental risk, and health and safety at work. In 
many cases decisions will be taken by politicians and company directors, advised by 
engineers and economists. Different understandings and different approaches may well 
be followed in different cases. This gives rise to at least two causes for concern. First, as 
is well-known, an uncoordinated approach may give rise to serious inefficiencies, in that 
it may be possible to use existing resources in far more effective ways. The second is also 
well-known, if less often discussed. The question of what risks we can impose on each 
other is fundamentally a moral one: the proper aims of safety regulation and the proper 
means of achieving these aims are moral issues. It is unclear that between them 
politicians, company directors, economists and engineers will be properly attuned to all 
the relevant moral issues. These two concerns come together in the following way: unless 
we have a firm understanding of the morally justified aims of safety regulation we cannot 
say whether any particular measure is rational or irrational, efficient or inefficient. 
The purpose of this paper is to lay the groundwork so that the moral questions appear in 
clear focus. I will not, however, attempt to settle these questions here. Rather in order to 
understand the proper aims of safety regulation we need to have a good understanding of 
its possible aims, or, better, the plausible aims.  Eventually this should allow an 
evaluation of such possibilities. My strategy will be to look at the way in which safety 
decisions are influenced, made, and perceived in practice, in order to bring out the 
diversity of factors which come into play. Accordingly the remainder of this paper falls 
into three main parts. Section 2 lays out the background to the issue, looking at the 
standard paradigm of quantified risk assessment, and the argument that some current 
practices can be seen to be irrational in such terms. Section 3 introduces and explores a 
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3number of complicating factors – summarized as fear, blame and shame – while Section 
4 produces an overall framework in which it can be seen how these differing factors 
relate to each other. The main theoretical proposal is to add the concept of ‘cause’ to that 
of hazard and probability, as primary variables in the analysis, and to show how this 
inter-acts with fear, blame and shame which are here treated as ‘secondary’ variables. 
One conclusion is, perhaps, a predictable one: that greater clarification of the proper aims 
of safety regulation is necessary before we can argue that any particular safety measure 
should be denounced as irrational or inefficient. But the main pay-off of the analysis is 
the beginnings of a model of the ‘anatomy of risk’ which sets the groundwork for 
informed normative discussion of the proper aims of safety control and regulation.
2. Quantified Risk Assessment
2.1 Safety has a price
Life is a risky business. We all face threats to life and safety every day. Some 
circumstances, and especially some working environments, seem especially risky. What 
should be done about this? What should be done, for example, about hazardous working 
conditions?
As a first thought, it might be proposed that it is always wrong knowingly to inflict risks 
on others, and so there should be an absolute duty on factory owners and others to 
eliminate all known risks to their workers. But a moment's reflection shows that this is an 
impossible aim. Virtually any human activity involves some risk. Even a perfectly 
maintained and serviced machine might malfunction with unpredictable effects. Even 
very sensible workers can trip on an even floor. These are risks we know about, yet 
cannot eliminate entirely.  
However even though we cannot eliminate all risks, we might be able to reduce many of 
them. So perhaps the goal should be to reduce risks in so far as this is technically 
possible. But this again seems to have some absurd consequences. We might virtually 
4eliminate fatal road accidents by lowering the speed limit to 10 miles an hour. We can 
end injuries to coal miners by closing the mines. Neither suggestion would be treated as a 
serious contribution to safety policy debate. Safety - and therefore life and limb - is not 
the only thing we value, nor, it seems, is it always the highest value.
The lesson is that safety has a price, in terms of its impact on other things we want or 
value, and there are limits to what we are prepared to pay. It seems that in generating 
policy we are forced to put a value on life - and this inevitably seems to mean a financial 
value - which helps us generate rules about how much firms, and in some cases the 
government, can reasonably be expected to pay for safety improvements.
This may seem callous or inhuman. Don't we know that life has infinite value? But what 
is the alternative? Not putting a price on safety? Allowing companies to operate with 
dangerous machinery, because we can't put an infinite value on life and any finite value is 
arbitrary and demeaning? This hardly seems an improvement.
2.2 The Standard Paradigm
Safety is regulated in somewhat different ways in different jurisdictions, although the 
differences in detail need not detain us. As it is the example I know best I shall take the 
UK as my main example. Work-related safety is regulated by the Health and Safety 
Executive, and its general approach is explained in a publication called Reducing Risk, 
Protecting People (Health and Safety Executive, 2001). Here, for simplicity, we will 
concentrate on risks of death, although other risks are covered too. In standard cases the 
basic approach is to divide risks into three categories.  Some risks of death are too high, 
in probabilistic terms, to allow and must be reduced (unless there are special 
circumstances). Some are so low (in the sense that the probabilities are minute) that they 
do not require any special measures. In the large middle ground are risks which although 
in some sense are ‘broadly tolerable’, should be reduced ‘as far as is reasonably 
practicable’.  (44ff)
5If a risk falls within the broadly tolerable region those in control of the risk are required 
to perform a risk cost benefit analysis. To carry this out risk assessors must calculate the 
probability of death for the risk under consideration. Suppose, for example, a piece of 
machinery could trap and kill a careless and negligent worker and that machines of this 
type kill 1 in 10,000 of their operators every year. And, as ease of calculation would have 
it, in your large factory you have 1,000 operators. Hence you should expect a death every 
10 years or 0.1 death a year, assuming that there is nothing special about your factory.2
Let  us suppose there is a possible modification to the machine which could reasonably 
be predicted to eliminate half the deaths in your factory, thus saving 0.05 lives a year. 
Should you introduce the modification or not?
For simplicity let us assume that you believe that the machines will be in use for another 
10 years, and let us also apply no discount rate for future deaths. To know whether to 
introduce the modification two further pieces of information are required. First, how 
much the modification will cost, and second what financial value should be placed on 
preventing a fatality (VPF). Currently the UK operates with a figure of a little over one 
million pounds (One million pounds at 2001 prices, and hence a few thousand more now, 
allowing for inflation). How to calculate such a figure is a matter of some controversy, 
which I shall not enter into here, but for the purposes of this paper it makes no difference 
what figure is selected.3 So let us round down to one million. Consequently as the 
modification will save 0.5 of a life over ten years you would be required to introduce it if 
(and only if) it will cost less than five hundred thousand pounds.
                                                
2 Where there are frequencies of this nature probabilities are relatively easy to estimate. 
Of course this is an unusual case, and especially in the case of new risks there can be 
great controversy about actual probabilities.
3 For an illustration of one important method for determining such a value see Jones-Lee, 
et al (1999). In the US different figures are used. According to Richard Posner, current 
estimates range from $4million to $9million with a mean of $7million. Posner (2002: 
166). For further discussion of the US approach see Sunstein (2002: 153-90).
6This general approach is intended to apply to all work related risks in the UK. It was first 
devised as a response to the risks of nuclear power stations. It also, for some reason, 
applies to the risks of railway travel, and the location of airports, although not to road 
travel, and not for product safety. However, it could be easily be adapted to these cases 
too.
2.3 The Irrationality Argument
What I have described is one application of risk cost-benefit analysis, which in turn is a 
from of quantified risk analysis. Many people find these types of approaches rather 
chilling, at least at first. However risk cost benefit analysis can be used as a very 
powerful tool  for examining current practice. One familiar debate concerns the 
contrasting situations of rail and road safety. 
In recent years the UK public has become very concerned about railway safety, and in 
particular about train crashes. How many passengers die in railway accidents in the UK 
each year? In a recent, as yet unpublished, study around 1000 people were asked this 
question. Their answers lay in the range 10 to 2,000, with a mean, excluding outliers, of 
99. In the last decade the actual average number was about 6 deaths of passengers per 
year. Passenger deaths, in fact, are only a small proportion of deaths of the railways in the 
UK. Over recent years the annual average number of deaths on the railways as a whole is 
about 275, with the vast majority being suicides and trespassers. (Others include 
members of the workforce, people at stations and occupants of vehicles on the line.)
Recently technology has been introduced, at a cost of about £585 million, to make it less 
likely that trains will run into another train if they run through a red light. (Commission 
for Integrated Transport, 2004 section 3) Arguably this is already saving lives, albeit at a 
cost of somewhere between 5 million and 20 million pounds a life saved, depending on 
what is counted (whether or not injuries are counted as fractions of death) and how long a 
7time period is taken. Further technological innovation - Automatic Train Protection - is 
being discussed which would make it theoretically impossible - i.e. impossible if the 
system works - for a train to run a red light. The system currently under active discussion, 
on the lowest estimate I have seen, would cost £3.6 billion pounds. Even its defenders 
admit that it will cost close to £100 million pounds for each rail passenger life saved.4
Turning now to the roads, in recent years about 3,500 people die in the UK each year (the 
figures are remarkably stable), of which around 2,000 are occupants of cars. By every 
measure travelling by road is much more dangerous than travelling by rail. While there 
are always reasons to be sceptical about any particular calculation, there are indications 
that the hundreds of million recently spent on the railways could have saved perhaps ten 
times as many people on the roads. And for £3.6 billion miracles could happen, at least if 
road safety campaigners are to be believed.
To bring out the disparity between our attitude to road and rail safety consider the 
arguments of commentators who have discussed the aftermath of the Hatfield rail 
accidents. At Hatfield a high speed train was derailed when the track it was travelling on 
shattered. 4 people died, and others were injured. A very cautious response followed, and 
speed restrictions were enforced throughout the network so that all relevant track could 
be checked for similar faults. The resulting memorable chaos meant that train travel was 
unreliable to an unprecedented degree; it was as if there was no timetable. Frustrated 
passengers took to their cars. It has been estimated that there may have been as many as 5 
                                                
4 Commission for Integrated Transport, 2004.  Some non-passenger lives, it has been 
claimed, would also be saved, although some workers may die installing it. There are 
further arguments on both sides claiming that the cost per life saved would be higher or 
lower. It is worth noting that currently most of those who defend the introduction of ATP 
do so on the basis of the commercial and performance benefits it is calculated to bring, 
and not on its contribution to safety.
8extra road deaths in the first month as a result.5 Although the comparison may seem 
rather mischievous, it appears that in some sense we would have been better off with no 
speed restrictions and a Hatfield sized crash every second month, compared to what, it is 
claimed, actually happened.
These examples bring out a stark general message. We can easily save more lives by 
spending our resources in different ways. Indeed some analysts are raising the possibility 
(behind closed doors) that we should significantly reduce the amount of money we 
already spend on railway safety, diverting the resources to road safety, public health, or 
even foreign aid. Essentially the same argument is made in the US concerning consumer 
protection and environmental protection. Huge sums are being spent to mitigate tiny 
risks, while much larger risks go ignored. (Sunstein 2002) It seems hard to avoid the 
conclusion that this is an irrational state of affairs. For this reason I shall call it the 
irrationality argument, and it is growing in popularity. So, for example, Bjorn Lomborg 
has notoriously argued that instead of spending trillions of dollars slowing down global 
warming by a few years, we would do better to spend a fraction of that money helping 
developing countries build the level of infrastructure that will allow them permanently to 
cope with effects of global warming.  (Lomborg 2003, drawing on Lomborg 2001). 
Although, no doubt, the science and economics are contestable, this line of argument -
another application of the irrationality argument - can be made to seem quite compelling. 
Those who oppose it are portrayed as supporters of the politics of gesture and a 
dangerous menace to rational thought and even to life on earth.
                                                
5 This figure is reported as an estimate, but without attribution, by Sunstein (2002: 2). 
However Sunstein’s diagnosis of the change in behaviour as resulting from individual 
over-reaction to small risks seems mistaken. Rather it was a perfectly rational response to 
massive disruption to the service, caused by the industry’s highly cautious response to the 
incident. Further his comment that these five road deaths is ‘nearly equal the total number 
of deaths from train accidents in the previous thirty years’ is extraordinary. The true 
figure, according to Evans (2005), is close to 200. 
9I hold no brief for current practices, and I accept that thinking through the consequences 
of the irrationality argument can be liberating. Yet I will argue that we should not be 
quite so quick to think that the irrationality argument settles anything. There are subtleties 
which we need to investigate first. This is another way of saying that it is possible that 
risk cost-benefit analysis, as currently used, does not capture all the information that is 
needed in order to make the best decisions.
3. Complicating Factors
3.1 Fear Reduction
Each of us is afraid of some risks, but less so of others. What is the relation between risk 
and fear? To make progress we must distinguish objective risk and subjective risk, or in 
other words belief in risk. For there need be no relation between objective risk and fear. 
How can you fear an unknown risk? Well, of course you can fear the unknown, but there 
is no reason to think that anyone's fear will be related to the actual risk. Furthermore it is 
well known that fear may be out of all proportion to the objective risk; this is the central 
finding of those who argue for the ‘social amplification of risk’: essentially the idea that 
there are numerous social mechanisms which can make people feel that risks are much 
higher, or lower, than in fact they are. (Pidgeon, et al 2003) But, more pertinently, is there 
a clear correlation between subjective risk and fear? Obviously they are not the same 
thing as one is a belief and the other an emotion. But there could be a causal, or even a 
partially constitutive, relationship. Let us, in the first instance, assume there is some sort 
of direct connection, although we will examine this shortly.
It seems clear that people may pay their own money, or agree to spend taxpayers' money, 
to reduce risks in order increase their sense of safety.6 Or, to put this another way round, 
                                                
6 The distinction between death reducing policies and anxiety reducing policies is 
explained well in Schelling 1968. 
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it is reasonable to believe that people are prepared to pay more to reduce those risks they 
fear most. But notice if the point of risk regulation is to reduce each individual's 
subjective sense of being at risk then already we can see that the irrationality argument 
may not go through in such straightforward fashion. For the irrationality argument 
concerned objective risk. It argues that particular risk reduction policies are irrational 
because they are inefficient means of achieving the goal of reducing objective risk. The 
point about inefficiency relative to the goal of risk reduction can be granted, but 
irrationality need not follow. For if the point of safety policies is, or includes, the 
reduction of subjective risk- to increase feelings of security - then the failure to reduce 
objective risk is no longer decisive. Indeed, we can generalise this point. If the goal of 
safety policy includes anything other than objective risk reduction, then it is moot 
whether the irrationality argument goes through. Everything needs to be recalculated in 
the light of the new goals of policy.
Here, though, defenders of the irrationality argument may well change tack. The point, 
they will say, of safety regulation ought to be reduction of objective risk. How plausible 
is this? Note that this response need not downplay the importance of fear, anxiety and 
insecurity in people's lives. Such emotions, it can be conceded, are terrible things to 
suffer. Perhaps they are much worse than the presence of small risks in one's life. After
all, small risks rarely lead to actual harm, whereas fear and so on can have a constant 
dampening effect on one's spirits. But, so the argument goes, the way to respond to this is 
not to introduce expensive means of reducing what may already be barely significant 
risks. Instead education is needed so that public fears track the real risks, and people 
worry about only what they ought to be worried about. False fears should be calmed by 
good information and the same means should be used to ensure that people come to fear 
the objective risks they face.
While this appears very attractive it nevertheless relies on some assumptions which may 
well be false. In particular it relies on an intuitive assessment of the effectiveness – and 
hence the costs and benefits - of alternative policies. Changing public attitudes and 
emotions through provision of information is very difficult. Or rather, it is difficult to 
11
change public attitudes in a positive direction. It is expensive to attempt, and rarely more 
than marginally effective. Who can we rely on to provide accurate information? In the 
current climate people profess to distrust scientists, doctors, the government, bankers, big 
business, the police, the media, civil servants, lawyers, educationalists, anyone in the 
employ of the government and, indeed, anyone on a decent salary. In the light of this it is 
rather hard to see how anyone comes to any beliefs about anything. More pertinently, the 
prospects for a public education strategy which bring subjective and objective risk into 
step seem pretty bleak. I am not proud of humanity for this, but it may turn out that once 
we do the sums, the most cost-effective way of reducing public anxiety could be to spend 
huge amounts of money on almost useless safety devices. Certainly anyone who has 
traveled by air lately, and seen what is being done in the name of reducing risks of 
terrorism may well have had the thought: obviously not much better than useless, but 
nevertheless somehow strangely reassuring, at least for some people. But in fact the 
practice of symbolic safety measures to reduce fears is much older. Has, in recent times, 
anyone's life been saved on a standard commercial aircraft by a life-jacket? Or by that 
little whistle? 
The distinction between objective risk, and fear, is hardly news. It is becoming common 
in the UK to make a distinction between reduction in crime, and reduction in the fear of 
crime. This is clearly inspired by the recognition that fear of crime can have a deeper 
impact on people’s lives than crime itself, coupled with the thought that one way of 
reducing crime is to make people hyper-vigilant, which may make them hyper-scared too. 
So the two goals have a complex relation. Yet was it right to assume that fear and anxiety 
are so directly correlated with subjective risk, which I understand as belief in risk? This is 
not entirely clear. Studies show that women are more fearful of crime than men, even 
though they know full well that men are more often the victims of crime than women. 
(Burgess-Jackson 1994) However, this too is complex. Consider an example from John 
Adams. Are roads safer now for children pedestrians than they were in the 1950s? 
Statistically the result is surprising. Fewer children pedestrians are killed on the roads 
now than for decades. But this, he argues, is because we believe that roads are so 
dangerous that we keep our children away from them. (Adams 2001: 10-14) What this 
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shows is that we need to be very careful in how we collect and present our statistics. If 
women do not go out on their own late at night it isn't surprising that men are more likely 
to be victims of street crime at night. But if we were to measure 'crime per risk taken' 
then the figures may be very different. Or they may not. We need careful studies by 
people who are not setting out to confirm a particular hypothesis.
But nevertheless although for a given individual whether or not there may be good reason 
to believe that there is a positive correlation between subjective belief in risk and fear, 
there is no reason for postulating an interpersonal correlation. People just have different 
personalities. Some are neurotic, some are oblivious. And there are many shades in 
between. On an aggregative ethic of fear reduction we may have to reduce small 
subjective risks for one group before addressing larger subjective risks for another. And 
all of this is independent of objective risk. But the main lesson is that this reinforces the 
claim that the irrationality argument fails to take into account that saving lives is not the 
only possible point of risk reduction policy.
3.2 Causation and Blame
We have sketched out so far two main theories of risk regulation: risk reduction and fear 
reduction. This distinction is well-known. Yet we are far from finished. There is another 
dimension to which we should pay attention.
Standard risk analysis begins with two concepts: hazard and probability. The only hazard 
we are concerned with here is death, and so the risks we have been concerned with are 
probabilities of death from particular causes. However it is vital to recognise that 
essentially the same type of hazard can have more than one possible cause. Take the 
example of death in a house fire. Some people die in housefires caused by electrical 
faults, caused, in turn through freak accidents - rodents gnawing through wires, for 
example. Or the fault could have been caused by negligent workmanship. Or through 
deliberate arson. The death in each case is equally gruesome, although not equally 
morally culpable.
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Imagine that as a society we take a decision to reduce the number of deaths in house fires. 
Policies are proposed to combat each of the three causes: by means of regular safety 
checks; better training of workers; and better policing to track down and punish arsonists. 
In deciding which policy to adopt one possibility would be to carry out a cost-
effectiveness analysis, working out which policy saves most lives for a given budget. Yet 
an alternative approach would be to argue that it is more important to eliminate some 
causes of housefires than others. This would be to make the judgement that some 
processes by which risks are created and sustained are worse, in some non-statistical 
sense, than others, and so should be a priority to eliminate even if this does not lead to the 
most cost-effective way of eliminating risk. Thus the hazard/probability analysis is too 
superficial. We must also take into account the process by which the hazard comes into 
being, or is sustained, or perhaps, permitted.7
It seems that, in general, people worry about some processes more than others (Baier 
1986). For example it is widely documented that ‘man-made’ hazards are regarded as in 
some sense ‘worse’ than ‘natural’ hazards. However there is more than one sense in 
which a hazard can be worse than another of the same objective magnitude. One is that it 
makes people more fearful. Another is that it generates greater moral concern or outrage. 
While these may often go together they need not. For example I could be outraged at the 
existence of a risk that I do not even face. 
In the light of this it might not be surprising if a society chose to eliminate morally 
blameworthy culpable behaviour first. Morally culpable behaviour comes in various 
forms. Roughly we can distinguish malice, recklessness, negligence and incompetence.  
Malice is to set out a course of action with the deliberate aim of imposing harm or risks to 
people. Recklessness is to act knowing that it could cause harm or risk, but not taking this 
properly into account in deciding whether to act. Negligence is to fail to consider whether 
or not your action carries risks to others, when such risks were reasonably foreseeable. 
                                                
7 For another perspective on the importance of cause in risk analysis, see Hopkins 2004.
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Incompetence, in this context, is to carry out a proper risk assessment and decide to take 
appropriate action, but fail to do so. We blame people and organization where we feel 
they have violated some moral norm, and an extreme form of blame is outrage.
There are important distinctions here, and we may well feel differently about different 
types and levels of culpable behaviour, but to keep the discussion within manageable 
bounds I will consider only malice here. And it seems that we do have policies which 
give a priority to reducing hazards brought about by malice. After all, it is not obvious 
that the resources put into deterring, detecting and punishing murderers, or preventing 
terrorist attacks, can be justified on a risk cost-benefit analysis valuing each saved life at 
one million pounds.
Is it plausible that we should, as a priority, eliminate hazards caused by malice? I think 
that this would be a common view. But what explains it? One possibility is simply that 
we think very badly of malice, and take particular satisfaction in eliminating its effects, 
or, to put it differently, we find some actions moral outrageous and we find ourselves 
giving a high priority to removing sources, or potential sources, of outrage. I'm sure that 
this is at least part of the story, although not all of it. An alternative explanation appeals 
to the vital distinction between risk and uncertainty. Risk involves known hazards and 
probabilities, whereas uncertainty involves lack of knowledge, either of the precise nature 
of the hazard, or the probability of its occurrence, or both. For most people, in most of 
their life, they are faced with uncertainty, at least within a range, rather than risk in the 
technical sense. This puts us in quite a different situation, both practically and 
technically. For risk cost-benefit analysis assumes that we know the hazards and 
probabilities, or, at least, have a good basis for estimating them, or at least enough 
stability to apply some other methodological approach. Without this the analysis can't 
even get started.
The relevance of this distinction is that it is not implausible that once malicious human 
beings threaten, we are moved into a world of uncertainty, not risk. And perhaps what in 
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part explains any belief that we should give the rooting out of bad behaviour special 
attention is the further belief that bad behaviour places us under conditions not of known 
probability but uncertainty, and eliminating this uncertainty is the priority. With a few 
arsonists running around we cannot predict what is going to happen. And it is the same 
with killer sharks lurking in shallow waters, even though we don't tend to hold them 
morally to account. This may indicate that part of the problem does indeed lie in 
uncertainty.
However it seems highly likely that we find ourselves with two converging explanations 
in these cases: root out bad behaviour and control uncertainty. Both are distinct from risk 
reduction, and may lead to irrational results in such terms. But, many will argue, so much 
the worse for risk reduction, as the sole aim of safety policy.
3.3 Reputation and Shame
Alleged bad behaviour, though, comes into the picture another way too. Often a firm will 
pay more for safety than is mandated by the regulations. Why? Sometimes a firm may 
want to take expensive safety measures because it thinks it is the right thing to do. 
Sometimes there is a commercial advantage in having a squeaky clean reputation for 
safety. But for either reason a firm may decide to spend more than the regulations 
require. Is this irrational? The irrationality argument is that the redistribution of resources 
across sectors may reduce overall risk. However it is rare that it would be within the 
power of one firm to do this, as firms operate only within a restricted domain. All they 
can do is regulate their own area. Their own budgeting trades safety against other aspects 
of the quality of the product, together with prices and profits. Their choice is simply to 
spend more money or less on safety, knowing that they could well suffer commercial 
damage from any accident involving their own goods or services. Hence it is very likely 
that a 'not on my watch' phenomenon will sometimes operate; we know that there are 
going to be accidents but we don’t want them here.  Individual decisions may then lead to 
a very uneven provision of safety. Some firms may overspend while others underspend, 
depending on how prepared they are to risk harm and consequent reputational damage, as 
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well as legal liability and possible bankruptcy. That is, different attitudes to being blamed 
for causing harm will lead firms to different attitudes to safety. And it could be that in a 
given industry no one can afford to be singled out as relatively dangerous, even when 
general standards are very high. Conceivably this is true of air transport, where, we 
already saw, it could be argued that far too much is spent on safety measures which have 
either only a negligible, or perhaps symbolic, effect. But an operator may feel compelled 
to match ‘best practice’ since no operator can afford a reputation for being less safe than 
the competitors. This we could call the problem of clean hands - no one wants to be the 
site of where the harm takes place. 
This problem goes all the way up. A safety regulator cannot, for example, tell firms to 
stop spending money on safety improvements but pass the money to the health service 
instead. And, understandably, it will want as few deaths as possible in the areas it 
regulates. Excessive media attention, and a reputation for poor safety, however 
undeserved, follows accidents. A concern for reputation may lead to apparently irrational 
over provision and even over-regulation, in particular areas, relative to the goal of risk-
reduction. Yet, once again, if the aimed for goal is 'reputational damage reduction' this 
turns out to be rational after all.
And it does not stop with the reputation of the safety regulator. In the aftermath of a train 
crash people often feel ashamed to be identified with a country where this sort of thing 
can happen. It is shocking to find that even in a modern, industrialized economy at many 
junctions the only thing stopping our trains crashing is the driver giving the correct 
response to a trackside light, and a bell. Admittedly the system is set up so that if a driver 
loses concentration the train will stop automatically, but there is still room for driver 
error. And if a train crashes through driver error our shame that this can still happen in 
our country may overwhelm the thought that these things happen very rarely, and that for 
the last 50 years in the UK there probably has not been a week where more people died 
on the railways than on the roads.
This ‘shame’ perspective can be based on presumed international comparison and a 
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thought about how we must look to others. Once more, when one has got 'into the skin' of 
this approach it may seem quite reasonable to want to take steps to reduce the potential 
for shame, even if they are expensive. Yet from a risk reduction perspective it is absurd 
waste of money.
4. Modifying the Risk Assessment Paradigm
4.1 Perception of Risk and Societal Concern
This issues I have mentioned – anxiety, malice, recklessness, negligence, incompetence, 
reputation and shame – are not unknown to those who theorise and regulate risk. 
However risk management has struggled to work out how to incorporate them. Two 
leading approaches are what we can call the ‘perception of risk’ framework and the 
‘societal concern’ framework.
The perception of risk framework, drawing especially on the work of Paul Slovic and 
associates (Slovic, 2000), pays attention to how individuals perceive the seriousness of 
risks. So, for example, it is commonly noted that some risks seem to give special concern. 
Particularly important categories are those that are ‘dreaded’, such as the fear of cancer, 
and those that are outside the control of individuals, either in the sense that individuals 
have no influence over whether they are exposed to the risk or that there are no strategies 
they can personally adopt to mitigate their risk. Here traveling by car and traveling by air 
are an interesting comparison. Of course whether or not one is exposed to the risk at all is 
generally a matter involving choice. But once the journey is underway a car driver has a 
measure of influence over subsequent events in a way that no air passenger has. Such 
utter reliance on others seems to create special concern. 
Risk management needs to decide what to do about risks that give rise to special concern. 
One possibility, of course, would be simply to ignore special concern, which implicitly is 
what the irrationality argument recommends. But if one is unhappy with this approach 
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something else is needed. The UK regulations deal with dread risks of cancer by doubling 
the value of preventing a fatality from cancer.8 We can see how this modifies the standard 
risk cost-benefit analysis (RCBA). As we saw, in its simplest form RCBA derives an 
appropriate spending figure for risk reduction by means of a two value formula of hazard 
(number of statistical deaths, each valued at one million pounds) multiplied by 
probability reduction. The ‘dread’ factor can then used as a multiplier, so, in effect, a 
third variable. Hence anything that the perception of risk framework wishes to include 
can be added as a multiplier (or indeed divider) of the result that would otherwise be 
derived from the RCBA. In this manner the standard paradigm can be used in a much 
more flexible way.
‘Societal concern’ is a different matter. This term answers to the need to generate a 
concept to capture the idea that society may have concerns which go beyond the sum of 
concern each individual has for his or her own life. How to specify this is fraught with 
difficulties, given that its key defining feature is a negative: not the sum of individual 
concern. Therefore what is to be included can be contested. The Health and Safety 
Executive say the following:
Societal concerns [are] the risks or threats from hazards which impact on society 
and which, if realised, could have adverse repercussions for the institutions 
responsible for putting in place the provisions and arrangements for protecting 
people, eg Parliament or the Government of the day. This type of concern is often 
associated with hazards that give rise to risks which, were they to materialise, 
could provoke a socio-political response, eg risk of events causing widespread or 
large scale detriment or the occurrence of multiple fatalities in a single event. 
                                                
8 “HSE takes the view that it is only in the case where death is caused by cancer that 
people are prepared to pay a premium for the benefit of preventing a fatality and has 
accordingly adopted a VPF twice that of the roads benchmark figure.” Health and Safety 
Executive 2001: 65.
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Typical examples relate to nuclear power generation, railway travel, or the genetic 
modification of organisms. Societal concerns due to the occurrence of multiple 
fatalities in a single event is known as societal risk. Societal risk is therefore a 
subset of societal concerns. (12)
Clearly a number of different issues are brought in here. For example societal concern 
seems to include both direct costs – ‘large scale detriment’ – and indirect costs such as 
loss of confidence in government and presumably the safety regulators too. This may 
have further direct costs – loss of business to better regulated countries, for example – or 
the costs may be less tangible, such as scorn or being the butt of jokes. While many 
analysts seem to agree that there is such a thing as societal concern, and that it should be 
taken into account, there seems a great puzzle about what it is, precisely, and how it 
could be taken into account. One attempt at least to do something has been the railway 
industry which has used a  higher VPF for multiple fatality accidents than those that 
involve a single death. So, for example, one accident that kills four people is considered 
significantly worse than four that each kills one person. Again, this is to use societal 
concern as applying a multiplier to the standard VPF in the basic formula.9
Is it right or wrong to use an enhanced (or reduced) VPF to reflect varying individual 
concern (anxiety, dread)  or varying societal concern? Here, I think, the correct thing to 
say that it is right to wish to modify the standard ‘hazard multiplied by probability’ 
paradigm, but this is a crude way of doing so, especially as we do not have an agreed 
understanding of the nature of societal concern is, and how it is engaged. Can anything 
better be envisaged?
                                                
9 There is also the issue that some groups are especially vulnerable and so some 
weighting needs to be given to this. This may or may not fall under the heading of 
societal concern. Clearly it is a serious and important point. However it is beyond the 
scope of the current enquiry to consider this, as is the further, fundamental question of the 
degree to which public consultation is integral to the risk assessment and management 
process. I hope to address these issues in future work.
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Before we can settle this normative question – which is not in any case the task of this 
essay – we need first to understand how all the various attempts to understand and 
modify the analysis of risk can be brought together. Until we have an accurate 
understanding of the various factors in play it is hard to know what should properly be 
taken into account and how. So first we have to provide a descriptive model before a 
complete and compelling set of normative recommendations can be made. Yet before that 
we need to be as clear as we can about what the model is a model of: what precisely are 
we attempting to model? Here the best thing I can say is that we need an outline model of 
all the factors that affect human attitudes to risk, in the sense of influencing beliefs about 
how much we should do, pay or sacrifice to mitigate risks. Many of these factors affect 
public perception to risk. Others, such as the ‘not on my watch’ phenomenon – influence 
the attitude of those subjecting others to risk, or those who regulate risk. These can also 
influence public perception when there is an identification of some sort between members 
of the public and the organization in question, and so any failure of that organization can 
cause shame or embarrassment for the public. In the next section I will introduce a model 
of (part of) public concern, showing how fear, blame and shame operate as factors in the 
public perception of risk, and in calls for its mitigation. For shorthand, I will call this a 
model of the ‘anatomy of risk’.
4.2 The Anatomy of Risk
The main lesson so far is, I believe, that the standard paradigm that risk is to be 
understood as hazard multiplied by probability is inadequate as a way of modeling the 
actual concerns people have about risk, and the way in which those concerns translate 
into pressure to mitigate one risk rather than another. The ‘perception of risk’ literature 
provides a way of incorporating some further features by means of allowing that fear may 
be out of proportion to objective risk, and this can be included as a multiplier or divider 
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of risk.  This is already reasonably well understood in the literature.10 However, as noted 
above ‘outrage’, or alternatively ‘blame’ is distinct from ‘fear’ and so needs to be 
incorporated as a second perception factor.
This does not yet incorporate all the issues included under the heading of ‘societal risk’, 
which I have assumed stands for those factors which can influence attitudes to risk, but 
go beyond each individual’s concern for the risks that he or she faces. Drawing on the 
examples and analysis of  Section 3 of this paper it appears that for analytical purposes
the concept ‘societal concern’ is too vague to do any work, encompassing too many 
factors of quite different types. We do better to approach the analysis a different way. Let 
us begin by contrasting two rail accidents, the first caused by faulty track maintenance, 
the second, by a car which bursts a tyre at speed, skids and breaks through a fence onto 
the track, into the path of a train. The hazard in the two cases is for the purposes of 
analysis identical: loss of lives through derailment of a train. The probabilities may be 
hard to assess, but there is no reason to treat one as more probably than the other. If they 
are believed equally probably then again there is no reason to think that one will be more 
feared than the other. Yet the blame that will attach to the rail industry is likely to be very 
much higher in the case of faulty maintenance than in the case of the careless car driver. 
Indeed in the latter case there might even be sympathy for the rail industry.
If this is so then it seems that in this case at least blame attaches itself not to the hazard or 
the probability but to the cause of the hazard. Hence, it appears, the cause of the hazard 
must appear as an independent variable if we are to model public concerns about risk. 
Cause concerns how a hazard is created or sustained, and in consequence whether it can 
be viewed as a matter of culpable human action or inaction, especially the culpable action 
of those supposed to have a special responsibility.
                                                
10 For a review of some of the relevant literature, and an initial sketch of some of the 
ideas developed here, see Wolff 2002.
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One convenient way of understanding the various factors in play is to divide them into 
‘primary variables’ and ‘secondary variables’. On the present analysis the primary 
variables are three: cause, hazard and probability. The secondary variables so far 
introduced are fear/dread and blame/outrage. They are called secondary because they take 
the primary variables as their object. In the standard cases fear attaches to hazard and 
probability – the ‘bigger’ the risk, the more it is feared – whereas blame or outrage 
attaches to cause, as illustrated. But note that each of fear and blame/outrage can take as 
their object each of cause, hazard and probability. Outrage can attach to the hazard, 
independently of cause. If a hazard will involve many deaths, or deaths in a particularly 
frightening manner, this may create pressure to do more to mitigate the hazard, even from 
those who are not personally at risk and so have no fear for themselves or on behalf of 
family and friends. Here, then, it must be a sense of moral concern, rather than personal 
dread, that moves such people. Finally outrage can attach to probability. Even if the cause 
and the hazard do not generate outrage, the fact that something is happening ‘too often’ 
may do so. Note that it is not claimed here that everyone will react the same way, but 
rather that broad trends may be detectable. 
It may be that the secondary variables are indeterminate in number, in that a wide variety 
of further responses may be possible. Importantly, though, they must include shame, as 
introduced in Section 3. Shame can only be present for those who feel either identified 
with, or partly responsible for, the regrettable event. This is the sense in which ordinary 
citizens can feel ashamed of the loutish behaviour of the football hooligans who follow 
the national team, or ashamed at the racism of other members of their own family. 
Shame, then, seems to pre-suppose some form of identification. Shame, also, is likely to 
lead to the worry that reputation will also be damaged, which can then have further 
damaging effects.
Consequently while those directly involved in the organization imposing risks may well 
feel shame if those risks are culpably imposed, it does appear that this shame can also 
spread to the public. It could do so because the organization at fault is something with 
which there is strong identification – perhaps if it is a nationalized industry. Or it may be 
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because a regulator, who acts on our behalf, has not done a good job. Or it may simply be 
because we as citizens have voted in a government which has allowed certain things to 
happen, or prevented other things from happening. Hence even ‘natural disasters’ can 
give rise to shame, where the thought may be ‘how did we allow things to get to a state 
where this could have happened?’ Furthermore, like blame, shame can attach itself to 
each of cause, hazard and probability.
Shame, then, may affect public attitudes to risk, and may intensify public calls that a 
scandalous situation should be redressed. But as indicated, shame can be more private 
than this, affecting only those who are directly involved in allowing a risky process or 
event to take place. And, as also noted, there can be reputational and commercial factors 
also to include, and will influence how an organization wishes to manage risk. It is easy 
to see how the model can be developed to include more secondary variables, such as 
these, and perhaps even tertiary variables, such as regret that an organization is the cause 
of shame in its citizens. The central point of this paper, however, is to argue for the 
inclusion of cause, alongside hazard and probability, as a primary variable, if we are to 
understand how various attitudes to risk are formed and sustained.
One further remark about cause is needed. Insofar as we are concerned with strategies to 
mitigate risk, cause appears relevant only when it engages the secondary variables of 
fear, and especially blame and shame. Where there are no such factors then there is no 
role for cause to play and the standard paradigm of hazard and probability appears 
sufficient to capture general concern, subject to issues about distribution, consultation 
and radical uncertainty, which I have not discussed in this paper. In this respect cause 
differs from the other primary variables. However this is not an argument that cause is 
generally redundant, but rather an argument that other effects cannot be properly 
understood without paying attention to cause.
Some readers may be surprised that I have attempted this analysis without appeal to the 
idea of ‘altruistic preferences’ or to the distinction between a ‘consumer perspective’ and 
a ‘citizens perspective’. Both ideas are a useful reminder that distinctions need to be 
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made but neither, in the end, takes us far enough.  The idea of altruistic preferences has 
been used to model the thought that people care about other things than their own self-
interest. (See, for example, Jones-Lee 1991, 1992) However using a single concept to 
attempt to capture the whole range of issues that fall under the heading of ‘not-entirely-
self-interested concern’ is problematic given their variety. A similar problem afflicts the 
idea of a ‘citizen’ perspective.11 Insofar as a citizen is someone with moral beliefs, this 
concern is better captured under the idea of outrage or blame. Insofar as a citizen is a 
member of a collective entity which in some, possibly very indirect, way is responsible 
for the policies, including safety policies, adopted by his or her country, the idea of 
‘shame’ capture the relevant aspects. Hence the model adopted here is intended to 
provide a deeper analysis.
The model, then, points to a range of factors that currently influence judgement. However 
it is not obvious that there are no others, or that they should all be taken account of in the 
risk management process. For example, as we have seen, it is sometimes thought that 
perception and reputational effects should be managed by better public relations rather 
than by taking ‘skewed’ safety decisions. Clearly when it is appropriate to attempt this is 
a vital question and it could be that practice ought properly to vary. So I should make 
clear that by setting out this model I am not assuming that the only way of managing the 
secondary variables is by spending money on safety measures. My point is only that we 
need a recognition of these factors and that it may turn out that the best way of dealing 
with them is, indeed, by spending money on safety measures.
5. Conclusion
My argument, then, is that to arrive at a model of the anatomy of risk – an account of the 
factors we need to include in order to decide how to manage particular risks –attention 
must be given to cause, hazard, probability, fear, blame and shame, and we must 
                                                
11 The distinction between a ‘citizen’ perspective and a ‘consumer’ perspective is 
discussed in Wolff  2002.
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acknowledge that this list is unlikely to be complete. However the model provides 
considerable insight into the factors which influence public perception. Once we have 
this model we might decide that normatively it is nonsense, and all that we should be 
concerned with is saving lives in a cost-effective fashion, which is what the irrationality 
argument assumes. Here I take no view on this question. The preliminary task is to 
understand the factors which affect how generally we think about risk management. With 
a descriptively more accurate picture of the factors we actually take into account we can 
sensibly debate how much should be included in the normative framework of risk 
management, and why. 
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